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1 Introduction
As Robinson’s article in this IDS Bulletin notes,
decentralisation is frequently advocated as a means
of improving public service delivery, but there is very
little evidence to determine whether or not this is
actually the case. Nowhere is this paradox truer than
in sub-Saharan Africa. As Mutizwa-Mangiza
(2000: 24) says, ‘many African countries have jumped
on the bandwagon of decentralisation and
participation without even assessing their own
experiences’. This article attempts to bring together
the evidence that does exist about the impact of
decentralisation on service delivery in the region and
gives general lessons that can be learned.
This article is divided into five main sections.
Section 2 provides a brief historical overview of
decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa. It notes that
decentralisation has played an important role in many
stages of the region’s history, but that its form and
objectives have changed significantly over time.
Section 3 considers the relationship between
decentralisation and service delivery. It points out
that decentralisation’s impact on service delivery is
indirect, in the sense that it affects a number of
intermediate factors (access to local information,
locus of decision-making power, resource availability
and administrative performance), which in turn affect
service delivery. Section 4 provides an overview of
the nature and extent of the evidence on the impact
of decentralisation on service delivery in sub-Saharan
Africa. It maintains that there is a dearth of
information about its ultimate impact on service
delivery in sub-Saharan Africa, but a considerable
amount of data about its impact on the intermediate
factors. Section 5 summarises the main findings that
emerge from both types of data, while the final
section draws some conclusions about the factors
that affect the impact on service delivery and the
implications of this for policymaking. The main
conclusion is that, although decentralisation has not
yet had a significant positive impact on the quality of
public services in the region, this is due primarily to
the wider policy environment rather than to
decentralisation per se.
Before proceeding with the analysis, three
qualifications about the scope of the article must be
made. First, any attempt to analyse the impact of a
concept as broad and vague as ‘decentralisation’ is
inevitably fraught with problems. The term is used to
refer to anything from the deconcentration of
administrative responsibilities within a single
government agency to the devolution of power over
all basic local services to semi-autonomous local
authorities. It is also used to describe the transfer of
power to a wide range of geographical levels, from
the regional or state level to that of local
governments or communities. Some restriction of
focus is therefore necessary. This article thus, like
other contributions to this IDS Bulletin, focuses
primarily, although not exclusively, on devolution
rather than deconcentration and on the intermediate
‘local government’ level. Second, sub-Saharan Africa
is a large and diverse region, so any attempt to draw
generalisations is equally problematic. The article
focuses on those countries for which secondary data
is most easily available,1 and those of which the
writer has personal experience, and it is biased
towards Anglophone countries. Third, the article
does not pretend to provide a comprehensive review
of all relevant literature. It aims merely to define the
nature and extent of the evidence about the impact
of decentralisation on service delivery and
summarise, with the help of examples, the main
findings.
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2 Decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa: an
historical overview
It is neither necessary nor possible to provide a
detailed account of the history of decentralisation in
sub-Saharan Africa.2 However, in order to understand
the relationship between decentralisation and service
delivery in the region, some historical background is
required.
At the risk of considerable oversimplification, six
main historical periods may be noted:3
1 Pre-colonial During the pre-colonial period,
African government was relatively decentralised,
consisting either of small chiefdoms or of much
larger but loosely organised kingdoms or states.
However, within these administrative entities,
there was an element of centralisation, in that
individual leaders, such as chiefs or kings, held a
considerable amount of personal power
2 Colonial Although there were significant
differences between the various colonial powers,
there were two common characteristics of
colonial regimes: first, power was highly
centralised in the colonial authority; and second,
this power was exercised through some form of
‘indirect rule’,4 so elements of the decentralised
pre-colonial systems remained
3 Transition During the last few years of the
colonial period, Western-style local governments
were established in many countries, particularly
those under British rule, where local government
was seen as a means of introducing people to
Western concepts of democracy and thus
preparing them for self-government
4 Post-independence 1: Centralisation In most
countries the period immediately after
independence was one of centralisation. This was
justified (both by governments and by external
funders and advisers) on the grounds that central
policymaking and planning were necessary to
bring about the rapid economic and social
transformation required
5 Post-independence 2: Deconcentration After a
few years, however, many governments began to
adopt some degree of decentralisation, primarily
as a means of improving the quality of local
service delivery. During this period,
decentralisation tended to take the form of
deconcentration rather than devolution, in that
powers were transferred not to semi-
autonomous local governments but to institutions
over which the central government retained
control. Particularly common, especially in the
one-party states that characterised much of the
region at the time, was the decentralisation of
power to regional and local development
committees, comprising a combination of
centrally appointed and locally elected officials
6 Post-independence 3: Devolution Over the last
two decades, decentralisation has maintained its
popularity but there have been significant changes
in both its objectives and its form. Although still
advocated as a means of improving service
delivery, decentralisation has also been seen (by
governments, external actors and the increasingly
influential civil society lobbies) as a means of
enhancing democracy and citizen participation
and (by governments and external actors) as a way
of reducing the role, and in particular the
expenditure, of the central government. This has
been reflected in a change in emphasis from
deconcentration to devolution (often known as
‘democratic decentralisation’) during this period.
It is evident, therefore, that decentralisation is not
new to sub-Saharan Africa and that it has been an
important part of the development agenda for much
of the post-independence period. However, it is
equally evident that there have been major variations
in the forms that decentralisation has taken and in its
objectives. Of particular significance is the fact that,
in recent years, decentralisation has been advocated
as a means of achieving three related, but
significantly different, types of objective: improved
service delivery, democracy and participation, and a
reduction in central government expenditure. The
implications of this in terms of its impact on the
former are discussed below.
3 The relationship between decentralisation and
service delivery
The theoretical relationship between decentralisation
and service delivery is discussed in the article by
Robinson in this IDS Bulletin (and in much of the
literature on decentralisation that relates to sub-
Saharan Africa).5 This section merely highlights two
key points that affect the analysis in subsequent
sections.
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First, decentralisation does not affect the quantity,
quality or equity of public services directly, but
through its effect on the following intermediate (or
‘process’)6 variables:
? Access to local information Decentralisation has
the potential to increase access to information
about local needs, conditions and priorities, which
are then incorporated into local development plans
? Locus of decision-making power
Decentralisation should localise the power to
make and implement decisions, and thus to
translate plans into programmes of action
? Resource availability Decentralisation may
increase the amount of resources available for
implementing programmes, especially financial
resources
? Administrative performance Decentralisation
may enhance administrative performance and thus
the effectiveness of programme implementation.
Second, decentralisation does not necessarily have
the above effects. As Ludeki (2004: 19) says: ‘A
country can adopt decentralised … structures but fail
to realise development. Conversely, a country can
achieve breakthroughs in development at the local
level under highly centralised, even authoritarian,
administrative structures’. There are two main
reasons for this. One is that the actual effects of
decentralisation depend on a number of factors,
including the type of public service concerned, the
detailed ‘design’ of the decentralisation, the way in
which it is implemented, the capacity of the various
individuals and organisations involved, and the wider
economic, social and political environment. The
other is that decentralisation is not the only factor
that affects service delivery. Other government
policies and the broader policy environment are
often equally, if not more, important.
4 Decentralisation and service delivery in
sub-Saharan Africa
There is a vast literature on decentralisation in Africa.
Most of it consists of detailed studies of individual
countries, often restricted in both temporal and
topical scope. However, there are a number of
comprehensive studies, which attempt to make
comparisons between countries and draw broader
conclusions. These are of three main types:
? Collections of country studies These consist of a
number of country studies (some including
countries from other regions), together with one
or more synthesis chapters. The studies are often
not strictly comparable and the quality of the
synthesis varies considerably
? Proceedings of regional conferences There have
been many conferences on decentralisation in
Africa, organised by regional and/or international
organisations and attended by delegates from a
number of countries in the region.7 The
proceedings vary considerably in terms of the
depth and objectivity of analysis
? Systematic cross-country studies (e.g. Crook
2003; Crook and Manor 1998; Mehrotra 2006;
Ribot 2002, 2003). These are potentially the most
useful but they are relatively few in number and
vary in focus; moreover, some include case studies
from other regions.
Unfortunately, this vast and varied literature provides
very little specific information on the impact of
decentralisation on the quantity, quality or equity of
public services in the region. Many studies do not try
to analyse the impact of decentralisation, while others
merely make broad generalisations about, or brief
references to, the impact on service delivery. Examples
of the latter are Crook and Manor (1998), Olowu and
Wunsch (2004), Oyugi (2000a) and Ribot (2003), all
of which are concerned with the wider impact on
what Oyugi calls ‘good governance and development’,
and Crook (2003),8 which focuses on the impact on
poverty rather than service delivery per se.
The few studies that do provide detailed data on
service delivery tend to be confined to specific
sectors or programmes within particular countries.
Examples include Mehrotra’s (2006) analysis of health
services in Benin, Guinea and Mali; Olowu and
Wunsch’s (2004) study of health services in Nigeria;
Fass and Desloovere’s (2004) account of education in
Chad; studies of Kenya’s Local Authority Transfer
Fund by Mitullah (2004b) and Smoke (2004); and
reports on Uganda’s Local Government
Development Programme by Kiyaga-Nsubugu (2004)
and Onyach-Olaa (2003). Schroeder’s (2003) analysis
of the division of functions between the various
levels of government in South Africa is somewhat
different, in that it looks at all public services; but it
focuses on the factors that should be taken into
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account when allocating functions rather than on
actual performance.
This dearth of information reflects the difficulty of
obtaining detailed, systematic data about the impact
on service delivery – or about many other outcomes
of decentralisation (Crook 2003; Ribot 2003;
Therkildsen 1993a). There are two sets of problem.
One is the logistical complexity and cost of
undertaking the necessary research, which ideally
requires ‘before’ and ‘after’ studies in a number of
different countries. The other is the complexity of
the relationship between decentralisation and service
delivery (discussed in the previous section), which
makes it difficult to attribute any observed changes
in the latter to decentralisation reforms.
Fortunately, however, there is a substantial amount
of information about the impact of decentralisation
on the intermediate variables – access to local
information, locus of decision-making power,
resource availability and administrative performance –
which provide the hypothetical link between
decentralisation and improved service delivery. It is
not possible here to discuss the literature on these
intermediate variables in any depth.9 However, there
are three comparative studies that warrant particular
mention. They are Crook and Manor’s (1998) study,
which, although covering only two countries in
Africa (Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire), provides unusually
detailed information; Olowu and Wunsch’s (2004)
collection of case studies, which are diverse in nature
but are analysed in depth using a common analytical
framework; and Ribot’s (2003) comprehensive and
detailed analysis of the theory and practice of
democratic decentralisation in Africa.
5 Decentralisation and service delivery in
sub-Saharan Africa: the findings
This section summarises the main findings concerning
the impact of decentralisation on service delivery in
the region. It is divided into five subsections. The first
one summarises the limited evidence regarding the
impact on service delivery itself, while the others
consider the evidence about each of the main
intermediate variables identified above, namely access
to local information, locus of decision-making power,
resource availability, and administrative performance.
5.1 Impact on service delivery
The main impression gained from the limited data on
the actual impact on service delivery is that
decentralisation has done little to improve the
quantity, quality or equity of public services in the
region. For example, Walter Oyugi (2000b: 20), a
veteran observer of decentralisation in Africa,
concludes that decentralisation ‘has failed to act as a
spur to democratic development management and
efficient and effective delivery of services’, while
Ribot (2003: 10) notes that ‘evidence that
decentralization or deconcentration leads to better
service delivery is thin’, and Crook (2003) and
Mitullah (2004a) find little evidence that it has
enhanced the position of the poor. Studies of public
perception of the quality of local government service
provision also tend to be negative. For example,
Fjeldstad (2001: 294) found that at least two-thirds
of people interviewed in two local authorities in
Tanzania described council services as ‘bad’, while
Crook and Manor (1998: 186, 255) found that 70 per
cent of interviewees in Ghana and 54 per cent in
Côte d’Ivoire considered their local authorities unable
to ‘satisfy the needs of their area’.10
The few documented cases of a positive correlation
between decentralisation and service delivery are
limited in scope and subject to qualification. Many
come from the health sector, where decentralisation
has been actively promoted at the international level
for many years (Mills 1990). For example, Mehrotra
(2006: 269, 278–9) reports that the decentralisation
of primary healthcare services to locally elected
health committees in Guinea, Mali and Benin and to
local governments in Mozambique, has increased
access to affordable health services, which has in turn
increased immunisation rates and reduced infant
mortality. Similar claims are made by Olowu and
Wunsch (2004) in relation to the decentralisation of
primary healthcare services to local governments in
Nigeria between 1988 and 1995, and by Andrews and
Schroeder (2003) in the case of Niger. However, all
these writers report variations in performance from
one area to another and many operational problems.
Moreover, in all the cases decentralisation was
confined to one sector and in only two (Mozambique
and Nigeria) were powers decentralised to local
governments. Another sector for which there is some
information is road maintenance. Andrews and
Schroeder (2003) quote evidence from the World
Bank (1994: 74–8) that decentralisation of road
maintenance responsibilities can improve both the
speed and quality of service provision.11 However, they
emphasise that this is not necessarily the case and
that, as with health services, the impact depends on
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the extent and form of decentralisation and the way
in which it is implemented.
A rather different example is Fass and Desloovere’s
(2004) account of community control over primary
education in Chad. In this case, local residents in
areas where the government had failed to provide
primary education decided to take the matter into
their own hands and organised and funded their
own schools. However, one may question whether
these are really an example of decentralisation, since
the community involvement was a voluntary initiative
that stemmed from the state’s failure to provide
services. Moreover, when the state found out what
the communities were doing, it restricted their role
by requiring that community schools meet minimum
national standards.12
There are also reports of positive outcomes from the
decentralisation of funds for capital development to
local authorities. Two such examples are Uganda’s
Local Government Development Programme
(Kiyaga-Nsubugu 2004; Onyach-Olaa 2003) and
Kenya’s Local Authority Transfer Fund (Mitullah
2004b; Smoke 2003). In this case, however, the
impact is on infrastructure rather than service
delivery per se; in fact, one could argue that the
decentralisation of funds for the construction of
infrastructure without comparable measures to
improve operation and maintenance can create as
many problems as it solves.
Uganda also illustrates a rather different type of
‘success’ story. Decentralisation of responsibility for
provision of most local public services to district
councils has been accompanied by significant
improvements in the quantity and (albeit to a lesser
extent) quality of service provision, particularly in the
case of health and education facilities (Makara 2000;
Uganda 2002a). However, it is difficult to prove a
causal relationship between the two. In fact, it is
quite likely that the increase is due primarily to the
vast injection of donor funds that has been made
during this period under Uganda’s Poverty Alleviation
Action Plan, rather than to decentralisation.
The Ugandan case illustrates the problem (noted in
the previous section) of determining a causal
relationship between decentralisation and service
delivery. It is important to note that this problem
works both ways. On the one hand, it means that, in
cases like Uganda, it is very difficult to attribute
improvements in service delivery to decentralisation.
But it also means that, in countries where
decentralisation has coincided with decreases in the
quality of public service provision, there is little or no
evidence to suggest that this is due to
decentralisation. In other words, one should not
blame decentralisation for the poor quality of service
provision in many African countries. As most
commentators point out, the problems stem from
more fundamental characteristics of African states,
which hamper any form of service delivery, whether
centralised or decentralised. This point will become
clearer when we look at the evidence about the
impact of decentralisation on the intermediate
variables that in turn determine the impact on
service delivery – in other words, when we examine
the process of decentralisation.
5.2 Access to local information
There is a considerable amount of information about
the extent to which and ways in which
decentralisation enables information on local needs,
conditions and priorities to be accessed and
incorporated into local development plans. However,
it is not always easy to extract this information from
the broader debate about the relationship between
decentralisation and popular participation, of which
it is a part. Our concern here is with participation as
a means of enhancing the quality and relevance of
development plans – and thus potentially the
‘allocative efficiency’ of resource use, rather than as a
democratic right or means of citizen empowerment.13
Several conclusions emerge from this information.
First, the quality of information depends on who
participates, which in turn depends on the
composition of the institutions to which power is
decentralised (Conyers 1999; Ribot 2003). Over the
years, powers have been decentralised to a wide
range of institutions in Africa, including central
government field staff, ‘arms-length’ management
bodies, political representatives of the central
government, elected local authorities, ‘traditional’
leaders and a variety of community-based
organisations, and also to ‘composite’ bodies (such as
the regional and local development committees
characteristic of ‘one-party state models’ of
decentralisation) composed of any combination of
the above.
Second, no one of these institutions is necessarily
‘best’ in terms of representing and responding to
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local interests. Effectiveness depends not just on the
type of institution but on its structure and
composition, the motivation and capacity of the
individuals involved, and local and national power
structures. Of particular significance is the finding
that devolution is not necessarily more effective than
deconcentration. The move towards ‘democratic
decentralisation’ in many African countries over the
last two decades was initially welcomed both within
the region and outside, since it had become evident
that the earlier forms of decentralisation, which took
the form of deconcentration rather than devolution,
were little more than an instrument for national
political control (Wunsch and Olowu 1995; Oyugi
2000b). In many cases, however, the results have
been disappointing. The elected authorities have
turned out to be little more representative or
responsive than their predecessors and the central
government has maintained much of its control over
local development (Crook 2003; Olowu and Wunsch
2004; Oyugi 2000b; Ribot 2003).
The problem stems from the manner in which
elected local government representatives achieve
and maintain their political power, which in turn
reflects the ‘patronage-based’ nature of both
national and local politics.14 Most representatives
obtain their support from a combination of two
sources: the ruling political party, to which they will
have to belong in order to stand for election, and
local élites, who more often than not are also
members of the ruling party. Consequently, they
tend to be more concerned about maintaining their
allegiance to these groups, which in effect means
promoting the interests of the ruling party, than
representing the majority of their constituents. In
many cases, the situation is exacerbated by lack of
pressure from civil society organisations, which are
often weak and sometimes part of the same political
patronage system (Kasfir 1998; Robinson and
Friedman 2005). This problem is particularly well
documented in Uganda (Francis and James 2003;
Mwenda and Tangri 2005; Titeca 2005),15 but is
prevalent in many other countries, including Kenya
(Musyoki and Nyamu-Musembi 2005) and Ghana
(Ayee 2004a,b). In Ghana, the problem is
exacerbated by a high degree of central control over
local governments, including the power to appoint
one-third of the members.
Third, there is an important difference between
‘participation’ and ‘influence’. The evidence from
Africa supports the point made so clearly by Blair
(2000), that it is relatively easy to increase the
number and range of people who participate in
local government and administration, but much
more difficult to increase the extent to which they
influence decision making. Once again, the key
factor is the local power structure, which
determines how decisions are actually made at the
local level. The impact is particularly evident in the
case of deprived social groups, such as women,
ethnic minorities, and the poor in general. For
example, although several African countries (e.g.
Mozambique, South Africa and Uganda) have
introduced quota systems that guarantee women’s
representation in local government, evidence
suggests that most women representatives have yet
to have substantial influence over local decision
making because they lack the authority and self-
confidence to participate on an equal basis with
men (Goetz 1998; Goetz and Hassim 2003; MDP-
ESA 2003). Similar problems occur when power is
decentralised to bodies composed of very different
types of representatives, such as public servants and
community representatives or national and local
politicians. In such cases, the more powerful
representatives (in the above examples, public
servants and national politicians) tend to dominate
decision making (Cornwall 2004; Ribot 2003).
Finally, and on a more positive note, there is
evidence to suggest that, despite the many
shortcomings identified above, the extent and quality
of participation and representation are gradually
increasing. For example, most of the critics cited
above acknowledge that the establishment of
democratic local government institutions does at
least provide more space for participation than the
former deconcentrated structures, and that the
provision of quotas for disadvantaged groups is at
least a step in the right direction. Furthermore, many
efforts to promote more effective participation are
under way.16 They fall into two main categories, each
of which has a critical role to play in enhancing the
quality of democratic decentralisation. One
comprises attempts by local authorities (often
supported by regional or international organisations)
to establish more participatory forms of planning and
budgeting.17 The other category consists of efforts,
usually by non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
and civil society organisations, to increase the
capacity of local people to participate effectively.
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5.3 Locus of decision-making power
Debates about the quality of participation in local
level planning are only meaningful if local authorities
have the power to make and implement decisions
and thus translate plans into action. In this respect,
the main conclusion that emerges from African
decentralisation experience is that governments
have, on the whole, been reluctant to decentralise
sufficient power to local level governments to
enable them to have significant impact on local
service delivery.
This problem is manifested in several different ways
(Conyers 1999). In some cases, decentralisation
consists of no more than the decentralisation of
planning powers. This is very common in countries
embarking upon decentralisation for the first time. It
was a characteristic of many of the early
decentralisation efforts, when ‘composite’ bodies
(such as regional and district development
committees) were the main decentralised institutions
and their principle role was to prepare ‘integrated’
development plans (de Valk and Wekwete 1990). In
some countries, the limitations of this approach were
recognised and led to the decentralisation of more
substantial powers; examples include Tanzania’s 1971
decentralisation reforms (Conyers 1981) and Kenya’s
District Focus Programme (Barkan and Chege 1989).
But in many other cases, there was no further
decentralisation and those involved in local level
planning, frustrated by the inability to implement their
plans, often lost interest in the planning process; this
was the fate of Zimbabwe attempts at decentralised
planning in the 1980s (Makumbe 1999; Mutizwa-
Mangiza and Helmsing 1991).
In other cases, local institutions are given the power
to make decisions – often over a wide range of public
services – but are not given control over the
resources needed to implement these decisions. Local
government legislation typically includes a long list of
local government functions but control over the
resources needed to exercise these functions remains
centralised. This problem, which is characteristic of
many of the more recent devolution reforms, is well
documented in Ghana (Ayee 2004a, 2004b; Crook
and Manor 1998). Failure to decentralise financial
control is particularly critical – and particularly
common (Conyers 1999; Olowu and Wunsch 2004;
Ribot 2003; Smoke 2003).18 Moreover, the limited
resources that are made available tend to take the
form of central government grants (most of which
are conditional) rather than revenue-raising powers.
Uganda is one of the few countries where substantial
financial powers have been decentralised, but even
here, conditional grants constitute the main form of
local government revenue.19 The other critical
resource, and one that has received much less
attention in the literature, is personnel. Very few
countries have either decentralised control over the
public servants currently engaged in service delivery
or given local governments the authority and (more
importantly) resources to recruit their own staff. The
main exception once again is Uganda, where most
public servants at sub-national level are responsible to
district councils rather than national line ministries.
Another manifestation of the problem is long delays
in implementing decentralisation reforms. There are
often long time-gaps between the political decision
to decentralise, the promulgation of the enabling
legislation, and the implementation of this
legislation. Moreover, the content of the
decentralisation reform is often ‘watered down’ at
each stage. Zambia is a good example of this.
Decentralisation has been on the policy agenda since
the 1960s, but each of the many decentralisation
reforms has encountered implementation problems.
Chikulo (2000) concludes that, although each reform
makes more progress than the one before, the
country remains highly centralised and there has
been more deconcentration than devolution.
The final manifestation of the problem is a tendency
for central governments to try to withdraw powers
after they have been decentralised. Uganda illustrates
this phenomenon. The decentralisation reforms
implemented in the late 1990s involved the transfer
of effective control over most local services to local
governments, including control over financial and
personnel resources. Subsequently, however, the
central government has slowly but surely regained a
significant amount of control. This is most obvious in
the case of finance. The proportion of conditional
grants has increased substantially (primarily due to
the provision of large grants for primary service
provision under a donor-funded national poverty
reduction programme) and one of the main sources
of local government revenue (the graduated tax) has
been abolished.20 However, there have also been
attempts to reclaim control over district council
personnel, most importantly by giving the central
government the power to appoint chief
administrative officers.
Conyers Decentralisation and Service Delivery: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa24
5.4 Resource availability
The hypothetical case for decentralisation suggests
that it may increase the availability of resources
(especially financial resources) in four main ways:
(1) opening up new sources of tax revenue that
cannot feasibly be exploited by a centralised
administration; (2) improving the collection of
existing taxes; (3) facilitating contributions from the
general public (including both user fees and voluntary
contributions of money, materials or labour); and
(4) reducing the cost of service provision and thus
generating surpluses that can be used for other
purposes. Unfortunately, there is little substantive
information about the extent to which
decentralisation has achieved these objectives in sub-
Saharan Africa. The information that does exist is
piecemeal and consists largely of casual observation
or ‘hearsay’, rather than objective statistical data. This
section summarises the information that does exist
regarding each of the hypotheses posed above.21
There have been relatively few cases where
decentralisation has opened up new sources of tax
revenue. There are probably three main reasons for
this: the limited number of additional taxes that can
feasibly be exploited, especially in poor and/or
predominantly rural areas; the reluctance of both
central and local governments to increase taxation
for political reasons; and the tendency for central
governments to want to retain as much control over,
and access to, tax revenue as possible. Although local
governments are often reluctant to increase taxation
for political reasons, the central government is
sometimes the main obstacle. For example, as
already indicated, the Uganda Government recently
abolished one of the main sources of local
government revenue, despite strong objections from
local governments. Similarly, in Zimbabwe in the late
1990s, local governments applied to the central
government to introduce several new taxes (e.g.
taxes on land), but were refused permission.
However, there is evidence from both Zambia and
Zimbabwe of local councils introducing new taxes
when allowed to do so (Mellors 2006).
There is circumstantial evidence of improved
collection of existing taxes following decentralisation
in a number of countries; for example, Uganda,
Malawi and Zimbabwe.22 The improvement appears
to be due partly to increased motivation on the part
of local government officials, but also to general
improvements in administrative efficiency. However,
most of the evidence is less positive. Korsun and
Meagher (2004) found the quality of revenue
collection in Guinea, Mali and Senegal to be
generally poor; Crook and Manor (1998) found similar
problems in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana; and Therkildsen
(1993b) reported declining revenue collection in a
number of countries. In many of these cases, the
quality of revenue administration appeared again to
reflect that of administration and governance in
general, while in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana many of
the problems seemed to stem from central
government controls over local government revenue
raising. Some of the most detailed information about
local revenue administration comes from Fjeldstad
and Semboja’s study of Tanzania’s local development
levy (Fjeldstad 2001). This suggests that council
employees are more effective revenue collectors
than local politicians or community-based tax
collection agents, since the latter are sensitive to the
negative impact of taxation on their political position
and susceptible to corruption and bias. There are
similar findings about the shortcomings of local
politicians and tax collection agents in Uganda
(Francis and James 2003; Uganda 2002a) and
Senegal (Juul 2006). However, evidence from
Zimbabwe suggests that, when councillors are fully
involved in preparing the council budget, their
attitude often changes (Mellors 2006).
Although increases in user fees have often occurred
at the same time as decentralisation in African
countries, there is little evidence to suggest a causal
link between them. This is probably because policy
on user fees is generally made by central rather than
local governments, and tends to be determined by
the state of the national economy and/or donor
policy. For example, in the 1980s and early 1990s,
user fees were introduced in many countries, but as
part of structural adjustment policies rather than
decentralisation reforms. Similarly, in Zimbabwe the
government has decentralised control over some
services and increased user fees in recent years, but
both moves have been in response to its increasingly
acute financial situation and have not been
accompanied by improvements in the quality of
service provision (Conyers 2003).
There is often a positive link between
decentralisation and voluntary contributions by the
general public, especially when decentralisation
extends down to the community level (SNV 2006). It
appears that, given a choice, most people would
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prefer to contribute to specific projects from which
they will directly benefit than to pay general taxes to
a local authority. The case study of primary education
in Chad, cited earlier, is an extreme example of the
lengths to which people are prepared to go to
obtain goods or services that they value highly (Fass
and Desloovere 2004). Similar evidence comes from
Senegal (Juul 2006). However, voluntary
contributions are not only associated with
decentralised government; well-organised central
government campaigns and NGOs can both mobilise
self-help efforts. Furthermore, there is not always a
positive relationship between the amount of self-
help and the quality of service delivery. Thus, in the
case of Chad, it was a response to the government’s
inability to provide basic services and it was merely a
case of ‘some form of schooling is better than none’.
Similarly, in Zimbabwe, the promotion of
community-based maintenance of rural water
supplies was in large part a response to the
government’s inability to fund those services itself,
and was again accompanied by a general decline in
the quality of service provision (Conyers 2003), while
in Ghana, where the promotion of self-help by local
governments was again a response to financial
constraints at the national level, Crook and Manor
(1998) found that the quality of self-help projects
was often poor.
Turning to the final hypothesis, there is little if any
information on the impact of decentralisation on the
cost of service provision in Africa.23 However,
experience in Uganda (Mwenda and Tangri 2005) and
elsewhere suggests that, except in cases where
decentralisation has coincided with a drastic reduction
in public expenditure and thus in the quality of services,
as was the case in Zimbabwe (Conyers 2003) and
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire (Crook and Manor 1998), it is
unlikely to result in significant cost savings. There are
three main reasons for this. First, the transfer of
functions to local governments is seldom accompanied
by a significant reduction in central government staff.
This is due partly to general problems of ‘downsizing’,
but also to the fact that decentralisation often creates
new functions for central government staff (such as
monitoring) or means that jobs previously undertaken
by one field officer now require two – one to
undertake the central government component of the
job and the other the local government component.24
Second, even in relatively well-run local governments,
decentralisation tends to result in an increase in
overhead costs at the local level, because of the
additional administrative and political functions that
have to be performed. And third, decentralisation often
results in an increase in the number of local authorities,
and thus in total overhead costs. In Uganda, for
example, the number of districts has more than
doubled since the decentralisation process began.25
5.5 Administrative performance
The hypothetical link between decentralisation and
administrative performance is based on a number of
premises. Of particular importance are the claims
that decentralisation may increase flexibility and
therefore responsiveness, improve coordination
between the various agencies involved, and
encourage integrity and responsibility among local
officials. Once again there is insufficient evidence to
either support or refute the validity of these claims in
sub-Saharan Africa. In this case, the problem is not
merely the quantity and quality of data but also the
difficulty of measuring the concept of ‘administrative
performance’.
The main impression from the literature is that
administrative performance under decentralised
systems of governance is poor in most countries of
the region. For example, Crook and Manor (1998)
found the quality of administration in their two
African case studies (Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana)
generally inferior to that in the two Asian cases.
Olowu and Wunsch (2004) are critical of
performance in all but one of the seven countries
they studied (the exception being Botswana), and (as
already indicated) Korsun and Meagher (2004)
suggest that poor financial administration in the
three countries they studied was largely a reflection
of poor administration in general.
The potential benefits of decentralisation appear to
have been undermined by a number of factors
(Crook 2003; Crook and Manor 1998; Olowu and
Wunsch 2004; Oyugi 2000b,c; Ribot 2003), in
particular:
? Inadequate devolution of power, particularly over
finance and staff
? Vague and/or inappropriate systems and
procedures
? Inadequately qualified, underpaid and unmotivated
staff
? Political ‘interference’, corruption and abuse of
power
? Lack of ‘downward’ accountability.
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However, there is a need to put these findings into
perspective. There is, in particular, a need to ask
whether administrative performance has actually
deteriorated as a result of decentralisation and
whether the quality of administration at the local
level is worse than performance at the national level.
In most cases, the answer to both these questions is
probably ‘no’. The main conclusion that emerges is
that administrative performance at local level is, to a
large extent, a mirror of that in the country as a
whole. As Oyugi (2000c: 16) concludes, ‘studies done
on decentralization tend to suggest that more often
than not, the problems that bedevil the national-
level institutions and processes find similar
expressions at the local level in any scheme of
decentralization’.
The Ugandan experience illustrates this point. There
is no doubt that administrative performance at the
local level has improved dramatically in Uganda over
the last two decades. In 1986, when the Museveni
government came to power and the present
decentralisation policy was born, there was no
effective administration whatsoever at local level.
However, it is difficult to determine how much (if
any) of this improvement can be attributed to
decentralisation, as opposed to improvements in the
quality of public administration as a whole and a
marked increase in financial resources. Furthermore,
the many administrative problems that remain at the
local level, of which corruption and other abuses of
power are perhaps the most obvious, are also
characteristic of the Ugandan administration as a
whole.
Some evidence about the potential impact of
decentralisation on administrative performance is
available from the substantial number of pilot,
donor-supported local government capacity-building
programmes that have been implemented in a
number of African countries over the last two
decades (Conyers 2005; DIP 2002; Fjeldstad 2001;
Romeo 2003; UNCDF 2003).26 In most of these
cases, there has been no national decentralisation
reform, but unconditional grants for capital
development projects have been made available to
pilot local governments, together with capacity-
building support in the form of training and
organisational development. The short-term impact
on administrative performance has generally been
positive, including measurable improvements in the
quality of coordination, planning, project
implementation, and both financial and general
management. Three main factors appear to have
been critical to this success: the provision of general-
purpose development funds (especially if linked to
performance criteria), which gave local authorities
the incentive and the power to improve resource
allocation procedures; the complementary capacity-
building support, particularly if provided in a
‘facilitatory’ rather than didactic manner and focused
on organisational change rather than just training;
and the adoption of a flexible ‘process’ approach to
programme implementation by donors. However,
the longer-term results have been less positive.
Difficulties have been experienced in ‘scaling up’ pilot
projects into nationwide programmes, in sustaining
benefits when capacity-building support is removed,
and in replacing donor funds with permanent
sources of local government revenue.
Finally, there is also positive evidence about the
potential for enhancing administrative performance
through increasing downward accountability. The
importance of downward accountability is
increasingly recognised and many attempts are being
made to mobilise civil society organisations and
community groups to hold local governments to
account. Most of these are being promoted by
NGOs (both national and international) but some by
national and regional local government
organisations.27 Documentation of these efforts (see,
for example, Conyers and Cumanzala 2004; Goetz
and Gaventa 2001; Kajimbwa et al. 2005; Mushamba
2000; Musyoki and Nyamu-Musembi 2005;
Robinson and Friedman 2005: 15; SNV 2006;
Uganda 2002a) demonstrates that pressure from
below can have a positive impact on performance
and suggests a variety of possible techniques that can
be used.
6 Conclusion
At first sight, the main conclusion to emerge from
this brief overview may appear to be a negative one.
It seems that, as far as one can tell from the limited
evidence available, the many years of decentralisation
experience in sub-Saharan Africa have failed to have
a positive impact on service delivery. However, it is
necessary to qualify this conclusion in four ways.
First, it is important to reiterate the problems of
drawing any general conclusions about the
relationship between decentralisation and service
delivery, since so much depends on the type of
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service, the type of decentralisation, the way in
which it is implemented, and the broader policy
environment. As Olowu and Wunsch (2004: 123)
aptly put it, ‘the devil is in the detail’.
Second, one could argue that, despite the many
years of experience, decentralisation has not really
had a fair trial in Africa because there have been very
few countries where significant powers, especially
over finance, have actually been decentralised to
local governments. The problem of central
governments’ reluctance to decentralise is not
unique to Africa. It reflects the fundamental nature
of decentralisation. As Smith points out,
decentralisation is the ‘territorial dimension of the
state’ and the form that any decentralised system of
government takes is ‘the result of political forces in
conflict’ (Smith 1985: 201).
Third, it is not fair to blame decentralisation for the
poor quality of service delivery in much of the region
because most of the weaknesses of local
governments – including their lack of power – are a
reflection of the problems of governance in general.
Experience with decentralisation tells us a great deal
about the nature of governance in many African
countries, especially the high level of centralisation
and relative lack of accountability, and suggests that
the problems of decentralisation (like so many
others) cannot be addressed in isolation.
Finally, and on a more positive note, it is important
to note that the history of decentralisation has not
been static. There have been a number of positive
changes over the years, including the move to more
democratic forms of local governance, recognition of
the need for fiscal decentralisation, and the many
recent attempts to increase citizen participation and
downward accountability. This in turn suggests that
there is a need to see decentralisation as part of a
long, slow process of state building – and thus to be
realistic about what it can be expected to achieve.
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Notes
1 Those countries for which there is most
information include Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya,
Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and
Zimbabwe (compare Crook 2003: 78).
2 For useful summaries, see Pasteur (1999); Olowu
and Wunsch (2004, Ch. 2); Ribot (2003).
3 It is difficult to attach dates to these periods
because the timing varies from country to
country, depending in particular on the date of
independence. There has been a tendency for
countries that attained independence relatively
late to go through the same post-independence
phases as their predecessors, albeit often more
quickly. This suggests that, although external
factors have undoubtedly played a part, the
evolution of decentralised systems of government
is part of a wider process of ‘state-building’.
4 That is, through pre-colonial administrative
structures or, where such structures were weak
or non-existent, through structures set up to
replicate them.
5 See, for example: Andrews and Schroeder (2003);
Conyers (1999); Kimenyi and Meagher (2004);
Mehrotra (2006); Olowu and Wunsch (2004);
Oyugi (2000a); Ribot (2003); Smoke (2003).
6 The term ‘process variables’ is used by Olowu and
Wunsch (2004).
7 Three regional organisations have played a
particularly important role in organising such
conferences, and in promoting decentralisation
and local government in the region. They are the
African Union of Local Authorities, the Municipal
Development Programme, and the African office
of the United Nations Centre for Regional
Development.
8 Much of the data in this article is based on a
wider study, including countries in other regions;
see Crook and Sverrisson (2001, 2003).
9 For a comprehensive bibliography, see Ribot
(2003).
10 In the case of Ghana, a later survey by Ayee
(2004b: 83) found that 52 per cent of people
were satisfied with the level of service provision,
suggesting that performance may have improved.
However, Ayee is somewhat surprised by this,
since his general conclusion is that ‘decentralised
government has fallen far short of reducing
poverty’.
11 The World Bank findings do not relate only to
Africa. They cover 42 developing countries and
there is no breakdown of findings by region.
However, the report includes a case study from
Ethiopia, where road maintenance was
successfully decentralised to a local community-
based organisation.
12 For other interesting examples of community
intervention when state service provision fails, see
Goetz and Gaventa (2001: 24) and Lund (2006).
13 The ‘allocative efficiency’ argument for
decentralisation, often used by economists, is
based on the premiss that ‘local governments will
likely be better able to match public goods to
local preferences’, because they have better
information about local preferences and are more
likely to respond to local demands (Azfar et al.
2004: 22). For further explanation of this
argument and discussion of its validity, see Azfar
et al. (2004) and Mehrotra (2006).
14 The term ‘patronage’ refers to a situation where
politicians achieve and/or maintain their position
by giving favours (e.g. political positions, jobs,
preferential treatment, local development
projects, cash handouts) to their supporters. In
Africa, it is often referred to as ‘neo-
patrimonialism’, a term that suggests that it
resembles and/or has roots in the pre-colonial
‘patrimonial’ relationship between chiefs and
citizens. For various perspectives on its nature and
impact in the region, see Hyden (1983), Bratton
and van de Walle (1997) and Chabal and Daloz
(1999).
15 Titeca’s paper is particularly interesting. It provides
a detailed case study of the way in which the
National Resistance Movement, which operated
for many years as a de facto ruling party,
dominates most local institutions in western
Uganda, including local authorities and civil
society organisations.
16 See, for example: ACPDT (2002); Conyers and
Cumanzala (2004); Goetz and Gaventa (2001);
Kajimbwa et al. (2005); Mushamba (2000);
Musyoki and Nyamu-Musembi (2005); SNV (2006).
17 The concept of ‘participatory budgeting’ has been
introduced into Africa following the widespread
publicity given to its adoption in the city of Porto
Alegre in Brazil (Baiocchi 2003). It is being
promoted by the Participatory Budgeting
Knowledge and Action Support Facility for Africa,
established by the Municipal Development
Partnership for Eastern and Southern Africa
(MDP-ESA), in collaboration with African local
authorities and the World Bank Institute (for
details, see www.asaaf.org.zw/asaaf.htm).
18 Data on 22 African countries compiled by Bahl
and Smoke (2003: 13) revealed that in 15
countries, the proportion of government
expenditure channelled through local
governments was less than 6 per cent. It should,
however, be noted that in some of the other
countries the proportion was much higher and
that in seven countries it was considerably higher
than one would expect from comparative analysis
of other countries with similar conditions.
19 Information on Uganda in this section of the
article is based primarily on personal observations.
For further information on recent fiscal
decentralisation strategy, see Uganda (2002b).
20Moves to reduce the degree of conditionality of
the grants within sectors are currently under way,
but they will remain conditional.
21 Where no references are given in this subsection,
information is based on my own personal
observations.
22 This assertion is based largely on unreported data,
including personal visits to local authorities in
these three countries and personal communication
from colleagues working at this level.
23 This is part of a wider problem of lack of
information on the cost of service provision in
general, which, as Bahl and Smoke (2003) note,
hampers any attempt at fiscal decentralisation.
24 An example of this is education, where general
administration becomes a local government
function, while inspection remains a central
government function.
25 According to Mwenda and Tangri (2005: 457), the
number of districts increased from 33 in 1986,
when the NRM Government came to power, to
56 in 2003; and at the time of writing (2006) it
had increased to 76 (Larok, pers. comm. 2006).
26 The countries concerned include Zambia and
Zimbabwe (supported by the UK’s Department
for International Development), Malawi and
Uganda (supported by the United Nations Capital
Development Fund), and Tanzania (supported by
the Netherlands Government).
27 An example of the latter is the Municipal
Development Partnership for Eastern and
Southern Africa (MDP-ESA), which has worked
with local authorities in a number of countries to
promote such activities.
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